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This month's column again has
two parts. The general interest item
is an excellent discussion of
community income, federal income
taxation and divorce. This
discussion is authored by John A.
Miller, the tax professor at
University of Idaho College of Law.
He attended law school at the
University of Kentucky and
received his LL.M. in Taxation from
the University of Florida. Prior to
receiving his LL.M., Jack worked as
the chief tax counsel for the
Kentucky Revenue Cabinet.
This discussion of community
income, federal income taxation and
divorce is followed by a Tax Forum
which is an exchange of ideas of
particular interest to Idaho




In Poe v. Seabom the Supreme
Court established that for federal
income tax purposes in community
property states half of the aggregate
community income of a married
couple must be included in the
gross income of each spouse
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may have generated the income.[
This rule arose in the same year as
the Court's foundation assignment
of income decision, Lucas v. Ear,2
and, thus, became the most
immediate and important exception
to the principle that income is taxed
to the person who earned it. The
income splitting opportunity which
Seaborn created led to the
enactment in 1948 of a special rate
structure for married couples who
file joint returns which treats the
aggregate income of the couple as
though half was earned by each
spouse.3 In a broad sense, then, the
1948 amendments extended a crude
form of the Seaborn rule to all
married persons who file jointly
irrespective of the state in which
they are domiciled.4 Because nearly
all married couples in stable
marriages file joint returns, the
Seaborn rule now has its greatest
significance for divorced spouses
who were married for part of the
year and for separated spouses who
choose to file separately.
The income splitting which
results from the Seaborn rule can
create complexities and inequities
when a prolonged period of
separation precedes a divorce. This
is because the tax reporting liability
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with respect to the income of
separated spous'es residing in a
community property state may be
unclear and may not coincide with
the way in which the income is
beneficially enjoyed.5 Moreover, any
inequities are likely to operate
disproportionately against wives
rather than husbands because
women generally earn less than
men. When one considers the
growing body of evidence that
divorce already has
disproportionately harsh economic
consequences for women,6 this
outcome is particularly unjustified.
The potential discrepancies
between beneficial enjoyment of the
income and the way the Seaborn
rule attributes income for tax
purposes may be illustrated with a
simple hypothetical case. Suppose
Alice and Bart, a married couple
residing in a community property
state, such as Idaho, separate in
February but do not divorce until
December. There is no written
property division between them
until the divorce is final. During the
period of separation both continue
to work in the same jobs they held
before the separation, and Alice
receives $20,000 of earned income
while Bart receives $40,000 of
earned income. Because her income
is adequate to supply her needs,
Alice does not seek any support
payments from Bart during the
separation, but the spouses have no
express agreement in which Alice
waives her property interest in
Bart's earnings. Each spouse
consumes his or her earnings so
that in the property division there
is nothing more to divide in
December than there was in
January. The property division
divides their then existing




Under the Seaborn rule, Alice and
Bart are each obligated to report as
income for federal tax purposes
$30,000 of their aggregate post-
separation earnings of $60,000 if
those earnings are community
property under state law. Only in
California and Washington is it
reasonably clear that post-
separation earnings are not
community property (and even in
those states there may be some
doubt).8 In Idaho, post-separation
earnings are generally considered
community property.9 Thus. Alice
may be obligated to report $30,000
of income even though she had the
beneficial use of only $20,000.
There are a number of avenues
which Alice may use to escape the
trap set for her by the requirement
that she report half of the
community income without regard
to whether she actually received it.
First, she may seek to equally enjoy
the community income by seeking
Bart's agreement or a court order
specifying that she will receive
$10,000 from Bart (one half of the
difference between her earnings
and his earnings, i.e., 40,000 - 20,000
= 20,000 x 12 - 10,000). This could be
done by periodic payments or as
part of the final property division.
Normally this will represent the
most desirable course to follow
from Alice's perspective, and,
presumably, an attorney
representing her in her divorce
action would seek such an
arrangement at the inception of the
action.
Another approach, less
advantageous to Alice but which at
least prevents her from being taxed
on income she did not receive, is to
enter into a written agreement with
Bart at the time of separation that
the earnings of each spouse will be
his or her separate property. Under
this approach Alice will report her
post-separation earnings ($20,000)
and Bart will report his post-
separation earnings ($40,000). All
community property states permit
transmutation of community
property and spousal earnings into
separate property by written
agreements between spouses.'(
Thus, separated spouses can agree
in writing to an allocation of their
post-separation income and that is
how they will be taxed." Similarly,
the spouses can agree to divide
their community property as they
choose and then each spouse is
liable to report only the income
generated by his or her separate
property. However, in theory the
Service gives such agreements
prospective effect only, 2 and,
consequently, in the divorce
context their utility should be
limited by the degree of cooperation
and foresight exercised by the
spouses and their attorneys. 3
Then there is the Section 66
safety valve.' 4 This provision says,
in effect, there are times when
community income will be treated
as separate income for federal tax
purposes because the spouse who
has possession of the income has
abandoned the other spouse or
otherwise acted as though it is his
separate income. A number of
technical requirements limit the
application of Section 66, but where
it applies it requires that each
spouse separately report all of his
earned income as well as
community income generated by
business interests under his control.
The technical limitations of Section
SSOCIATE
O C IA TE D
9EPORTING, INC.
66 appear to prevent it from having
the wide-ranging significance
Congress may have intended for it.
In the hypothetical case of Alice
and Bart it probably would not
apply.
The last approach would also
have no application to our
hypothetical concerning post-
separation earnings but would
apply to divisions of already
accrued but unpaid community
income such as pensions or cash
basis accounts receivable. This
approach derives from Section
1041. 15 Under Section 1041 property
transfers between spouses or
former spouses6 result in no gain
or loss recognition to the transferor
spouse and in a carryover basis to
the transferee spouse. In applying
this provision to an agreement or
court order transferring one
spouse's community interest in an
item of accrued but unpaid income
to the other spouse one would
simply say that the transferor
spouse recognizes no gain and the
transferee spouse takes the
transferor spouse's zero basis in the
item. Later, when the item is paid,
the transferee spouse would include
the entire amount of the item in
gross income. One difficulty with
applying Section 1041 in this
manner is that such an application
could be seen as improperly
overriding the assignment of
income doctrine. The Service has
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Tax Thoughts
embraced this view.7 This means,
for instance, that the Service
believes that a transfer of a
community property interest in a
pension is a taxable event to the
transferor spouse.' It is likely that
the Service's position on this matter
will be tested in the courts.
This brief survey can only hint at
the federal income tax complexities
which may arise from separation
and divorce in community property
states. More detailed treatments of
the topic are available. 9 But one
conclusion that can be drawn from
even so brief a discussion as this
one is that the lawyer advising a
divorce client needs to consider the
interaction between these two
bodies of law. Failure to do so may
result in an unhappy client around
tax time. E]
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Tax Forum
Payment of Death Taxes on the
Death of the Second Spouse When
QTIP Election Made on the Death
of the First Spouse
Consider the following situation.
Husband has one child, Harry, by a
prior marriage. Wife has one
daughter, Wendy, also by a prior
marriage. Husband dies. His will
leaves his estate to a QTIP eligible
trust (i.e., all income to Wife, no
invasion rights, and then to his
child Harry on Wife's death).
The QTIP eligible trust is funded
with $1.5 million and the QTIP
election is timely made. Wife then
dies owning property worth $1
million. Her will leaves everything
to her daughter, Wendy. Further,
her will provides that all death
taxes will be paid from the residue
of her estate. The QTIP election on
Husband's death results in the
value of the QTIP trust being
included in Wife's estate on her
death. Thus, her taxable estate will
be approximately $2.5 million, on
which the death taxes will total
about $833,000.
Because Wife's will provides that
all death taxes are to be paid out of
the residue of her estate, her
daughter arguably receives only
$167,000 while Husband's son
receives $1.5 million from the QTIP
eligible trust. More specifically,
Section 2207A of the Internal
Revenue Code generally provides
that, absent other direction in the
Wife's will, any tax attributable to
the inclusion of the QTIP trust
corpus in the Wife's estate is
recoverable by her estate from the
person receiving the QTIP trust (i.e.,
from Husband's son). Thus, the
provision in the will of Wife stating
that all death taxes should be paid
out of the residue arguably
overrides the general rule of Section
2207A, with the result that all death
taxes are paid by Wife's estate and
none by the QTIP trust.
There is a question as to how
specific the language must be in the
will of the surviving spouse to
override the general rule of Section
2207A For example, a general
provision in the surviving spouse's
will that all death taxes are to be
paid out of the residue of the estate
may or may not be specific enough.
In any event, the interpretation
issue can be resolved by the
addition of language similar to the
following: "except that the amount,
if any, by which the estate and
inheritance taxes shall be increased
as a result of the inclusion of
property in my gross estate (for
federal estate tax purposes) in
which I may have a qualifying
income interest for life." This
linguage would be added to the
provision stating that all death
taxes should be paid out of the
residue. You may have
improvements on this language. If
so, please contact John McGown, Jr.
at Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley,
P.O. Box 1617, Boise, Idaho 83701, or
call me at 344-6000. 0
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